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I Introduction
The growing public interest in international comparisons of student achievement (e.g. PISA, TIMSS) has fueled the academic debate on the impact of organizational aspects of the education system. One of these organizational aspects is the timing and extent of tracking, i.e. the allocation of students into differing-ability schools or classes. The economic literature on tracking has focused on equality of opportunity and efficiency aspects.
While there is clear evidence that early tracking reinforces the role of parental background and limits intergenerational mobility in education and earnings, there is no consensus on whether early tracking is efficient or not. 1 One of the main arguments in favor of early tracking is that teachers are more effective in teaching homogenous classrooms. On the other hand, less gifted students may benefit from the presence of more gifted peers. In that case, delaying the separation into different tracks could be more efficient.
Recently, economists have emphasized that early tracking may be inefficient because track choice is influenced by factors other than innate ability, for instance the age of a student. Brunello, Giannini, and Ariga [2007] argue that the allocation of students to tracks is based on a noisy signal and that the size of the noise is decreasing with the age at first selection. Allen and Barnsley [1993] and Bedard and Dhuey [2006] stress that the long-run cost of the misallocation rise with the difference in the rates of human capital accumulation between tracks.
In Austria and Germany, students are allocated to academic and vocational schools at the age of ten. 2 Recent empirical studies for these countries show that the youngest students within a school cohort (grade) are significantly less likely to attend the academic track compared to their older peers [Jürges and Schneider, 2011; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010; Schneeweis and Zweimüller, forthcoming] .
1 See for instance, Bauer and Riphahn [2006] , Ammermüller [2005] , Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Pekkala [2009] , Brunello and Checchi [2007] , Dustmann [2004] , Malamud and Pop-Eleches [2011] and Hanushek and Wößmann [2006] for evidence on equality of opportunity aspects, and Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer [2011] , Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles [2004] , Pischke and Manning [2006] , Meghir and Palme [2005] , Guyon, Maurin, and McNally [2010] , Hall [2012] , Malamud and Pop-Eleches [2010] and Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr [2009] for evidence on efficiency aspects.
2 In some German states students are tracked at the age of 12. Within OECD countries, the age at first tracking varies considerably: In Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Turkey students are first tracked at the age of 11, in Belgium and Mexico at the age of 12 and in Chile, Luxembourg and the Netherlands at the age of 13. All other OECD countries track their students at the age of 14 to 18 [Brunello and Checchi, 2007] . This paper focuses on the effects of the school entry law on educational attainment and starting wages in an early tracking system. The school entry law assigns students to different school entry cohorts based on their date of birth and generates an age difference of 11 months between children born in August and children born in September. This age difference leads to differences in the probability of choosing the academic track at age 10 [Schneeweis and Zweimüller, forthcoming] . August-born children are less likely than September-born children to attend the academic track in grades 5-8. Since the academic track offers a more advanced curriculum, a higher peer quality and teachers with higher qualifications (and salaries), the school entry law implies that younger and older students are exposed to schools of different quality for at least four years of their school career.
Furthermore, younger students are less likely to choose a higher secondary school at the age of 14.
In this paper, I analyze whether the initial assignment to different school tracks has effects on educational attainment and wages in the first years of the career. The analysis is based on a sample of male labor market entrants drawn from the Austrian Social Security Database and followed over time. I estimate the reduced-form effect of the school entry law on starting wages and short-run wage profiles and find a wage penalty of 1.1-2.0 percent for students born in August (the youngest) compared to students born in September (the oldest). I estimate a reduced-form approach without specifying any channel through which wages could be affected, but-to a certain degree-the data allows to analyze differences in the quantity and quality of education directly. The estimation results suggest that there are significant differences in the type of education but not in the years of education.
Younger individuals are significantly more likely to pursue an apprenticeship and are less likely to have at least higher general or vocational education and to hold a university degree.
The analysis of short-run wage profiles reveals a persistent wage penalty for August-born workers that amounts to 0.8-1.1 percent after five years of labor market experience. A more detailed analysis reveals that the estimated effects on (starting) wages differ along the conditional wage distribution with higher wage penalties in the middle and the higher end than in the lower end of the distribution. Overall these findings are consistent with prior evidence for Austria [Schneeweis and Zweimüller, forthcoming] .
II Related literature
An increasing body of empirical research documents that the position of a student in the age distribution within a grade or class has a causal effect on school performance [e.g. Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Datar, 2006; Fredriksson andÖckert, 2006; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008] . Since part of the variation in age is due to parental discretion in the timing of school entry, the causal effect is identified by using only the exogenous variation in age that stems from the distribution of births over the calendar year and the school entry cutoff date. The birth month of a student determines his or her relative age within a grade because school entry is based on a specific cutoff date. If the entry rule is strictly followed, students born just after the cutoff date are almost one year older than students born just before the cutoff date. Using birth month relative to the cutoff date as an instrument for a student's age in a given grade, these studies identify the causal effect of relative age 3 on school performance for compliers. 4 Compliers are students who are among the oldest within a grade only because they are born after the cutoff date and would be among the youngest if they were born before the cutoff date.
One key criticism in this literature is that this identification strategy does not allow to discriminate between the school entry age effect and the test age effect as long as students' performance is measured when they are still in school. 5 A notable exception are Black, Devereux, and Salvanes [2011] , who disentangle these effects by using IQ scores of 18-yearold Norwegian students measured outside of school. They provide compelling evidence for a positive test age effect, whereas starting school one year later has a small negative effect on IQ scores. Elder and Lubotsky [2009] find that the relative age effect fades with the duration of schooling, which is interpreted as evidence that the test age effect dominates.
They also find higher effects for children with more favorable parental background, sug-3 The concept of "relative age" was first introduced by Allen and Barnsley [1993] and refers to age differences between individuals that are grouped by cohort (based on a specific cutoff date).
4 See Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin [1996] for the interpretation of causal effects in a heterogenous treatment effects framework. 5 The school entry age effect is the causal effect of starting school at an older age. The test age effect is due to the fact that some children are older when educational achievement is measured. The school entry age effect is perfectly collinear with the test age effect because students who start school later are also older when their educational achievement is measured.
gesting that the relative age effect partly reflects differences in skill accumulation prior to kindergarten enrollment.
Irrespective of their actual origin, relative age effects may be perpetuated by the education system, if, for example, students are separated into different educational tracks very early. In Austria and Germany, lower secondary students are physically segregated into academic (high track) schools or vocational (low track) schools at the age of 10 (in grade 5). Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] show that older students are 13-17 percentage points more likely than their younger peers of the same grade to attend a high track school in grade 8. Mühlenweg and Puhani [2010] and Jürges and Schneider [2011] find similar results for Germany, where lower secondary education lasts until grade 9 (or grade 10 in some states). Although students may revise their track choice in any grade, upward mobility is limited because of differences in the curricula between high track and low track schools. After graduating from a low track school, a considerable number of students does revise the initially chosen track by upgrading to a general or vocational high track school. While Mühlenweg and Puhani [2010] show that the relative age effect disappears because students have the possibility to revise their track choice, Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] still find an age penalty for the youngest Austrian students. 6
The evidence on age-related differences in long-term outcomes such as educational attainment or earnings is mixed. Using German survey data on the school entry cohorts 1966 -1980 , Fertig and Kluve [2005 find no significant relationship between school starting age and educational attainment, neither for West Germany where students were tracked at age 10, nor for East Germany where education was comprehensive until the age of 16.
Likewise, Black, Devereux, and Salvanes [2011] find no evidence that starting school later has a positive effect on educational attainment in a sample of Norwegian students born 1962 -1980 . In contrast, Fredriksson andÖckert [2006 find a positive effect on years of schooling and the probability of attending college for the Swedish population born . Their results suggest that the effect is higher for cohorts that attended a selective school system than for cohorts that were in the comprehensive school system that was introduced gradually between 1950 and 1967.
The latter two studies also look at the long-run impact on earnings. Fredriksson and Ockert [2006] show that the age effect on earnings is negative for younger cohorts and positive for older ones. This finding is consistent with a concave experience-earnings profile.
Although starting school later may have a positive effect on educational attainment, it definitely reduces labor market experience at a given age. The opposing results for younger and older cohorts may reflect that small differences in labor market experience are more important in earlier stages of the working life. Alternatively, it may be that the age effect is stronger for older cohorts because they attended the selective school system. 7 Black, Devereux, and Salvanes [2011] track different cohorts from age 24 to 35 and estimate separate regressions by age. They find a negative effect on earnings at younger ages and no effect at older ages, supporting the hypothesis that the cohort difference is due to the concave experience-earnings profile. However, their sample does not include individuals who were separated into different educational tracks early in the school career. Dustmann, Puhani, and Schönberg [2012] analyze the long-term effects of the type of middle school attended in grade 5 to grade 9/10 on labor market outcomes in Germany.
They distinguish between a direct effect that is due to differences in middle school quality and an indirect effect via completed education and show that the type of middle school affects neither educational attainment nor labor market outcomes of men aged 30 and above. 8 These results are in line with Mühlenweg and Puhani [2010] who find that relative age effect disappears after the second tracking because students have the possibility to revise their track choice. In contrast, Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] provide evidence that the relative age effect does not fully disappear after the second tracking in Austria.
In this paper, I estimate the reduced-form effect of the school entry law on educational attainment and earnings based on a sample of male labor market entrants in Austria, a 7 Fredriksson andÖckert [2006] are not able to discriminate between these two explanations because cohort effects cannot be distinguished from experience effects in cross-sectional data.
8 Grenet [2009] provides evidence for France where first tracking occurs at the age of 14. He finds that younger students (born in December) are more likely to be held back in school, are more likely to choose a vocational qualification, are more likely to be unemployed and have somewhat lower wages than their older peers (born in January). For the US, Dobkins and Ferreira [2010] find no effect of birth month on labor market outcomes (employment and wages) and other long run outcomes (home ownership and house prices) although there is evidence that the youngest students obtain more education than their older peers which is due to the interaction of school entry laws with compulsory schooling laws [Angrist and Krueger, 1991] . country where first tracking occurs very early by international comparison. By focusing on the outcomes of labor market entrants the study avoids confounding the estimated effect with differences in labor market experience and shows how the effect evolves as these workers gain labor market experience.
This study is also related to the literature on the effects of postponing or reducing tracking on educational achievement and labor market outcomes. Recent research by Malamud and Pop-Eleches [2010] and Hall [2012] show that the adoption of a more comprehensive schooling system had no discernible impact on university enrollment, wages, family income and the incidence of unemployment (and non-employment). However, in both countries (Romania and Sweden) students attended a comprehensive school system until the age of 14 (or 16) already before the respective reform. Accordingly, being born in August implies being among the youngest students within a cohort whereas being born in September implies being among the oldest students. Since children may differ in maturity, these entry rules are not strictly enforced. For instance, children born between September 1 and December 31 may enroll early under certain circumstances. 9 On the other hand, children who are not mature enough have to attend the pre-primary class instead of the first grade of primary school. Furthermore, if a student's achievement is insufficient in more than two subjects he or she has to repeat the grade. Since late enrollment (and grade retention) is much more common among students born before the cutoff date, the average age difference between September-born and August-born students is about 5 months (instead of 11 months under strict enforcement and without grade retention). 10
III Institutional background
Compulsory education lasts nine years. After four years of primary school, students are physically separated into academically-oriented higher general schools and vocationallyoriented lower secondary schools. The admission to a higher general school depends on primary school grades in the core subjects (Mathematics, German writing and reading) or an entrance exam. Furthermore, primary school teachers give recommendations but these are not binding. 11 Both types of education last four years but differ in many aspects, such as the curricula, and the qualifications and salaries of teachers. Formally, students have the possibility to switch between tracks, however, the more advanced curriculum in the academic track inhibits upward mobility from the vocational to the academic track.
In grade 9, the Austrian education system offers a variety of educational tracks: prevocational schools, a range of intermediate and higher vocational schools and the second stage of higher general schools. 12 Most students who attended a higher general school until grade 8 stay there for another four years or change to a higher vocational school. Both 9 The parents have to apply for early enrollment, the health officer of the school has to confirm that the child is mature enough and the primary school principal has to agree.
10 See Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] . 11 The majority of Austrian students attends a lower secondary school, e.g. in the school year 2006/07 about 67 percent of Austrian students attended a lower secondary school in grade 8 [Statistik Austria, 2008] . 12 There are several types of intermediate and higher vocational schools with different professional orientations, e.g. business, technical, tourism, teacher training, agricultural. Apprenticeship training is required for a multitude of occupations ranging from traditional crafts professions to sales, administrative and technical professions. 13 The acquired skill level strongly depends on the type of occupation. While part of these occupations can be considered as low-skilled, other-more forward-looking and medium-skill-occupations offer fairly good labor market and advancement opportunities.
IV Empirical framework
In the first part of this section the estimation model and the identification strategy are described (section IV.1). Then, I introduce the data and the estimation sample, and provide descriptive statistics (section IV.2). In contrast to previous studies the reducedform effect of the school entry rule (birth month) on earnings and educational attainment is estimated for a sample of male workers who enter the labor market for the first time. The advantage of this strategy is that earnings differences between the youngest (i.e. Augustborn) and the oldest (i.e. September-born) individuals of a labor market entry cohort do not reflect differences in labor market experience but rather differences in the quantity and quality of education or skills acquired before entering the labor market.
13 There are about 260 apprenticeship occupations.
IV.1 Econometric model
The estimation model is based on the reduced-form approach suggested in Bedard and Dhuey [2006] : 14
where Y i is the outcome of individual i (e. g. the starting wage), X i is a vector of exogenous variables, t i is the year in which individual i entered the labor market and ǫ i is the error term. The variable of interest, Assigned age i , is a discrete variable ranging from 0 for individuals born in August to 1 for individuals born in September. The difference in assigned age between August-born and September-born individuals corresponds to 11 months. Assigned age is obtained through a simple transformation of an individual's birth month:
Estimation model (1) imposes a linear relationship between assigned age and the starting wage of an individual. As a robustness check, I follow Dobkins and Ferreira [2010] and estimate a regression discontinuity model. A general representation of this approach is given by Bedard and Dhuey [2006] use assigned age as an instrument for observed age to estimate relative age effects on test scores for a number of OECD countries. 15 The estimation is based on the individual's birth month and not the exact birth date because this information is not available in the data.
where dist i is centered at the discontinuity and measures the distance between an individual's birth month b i and the cutoff date b 0 = 9. 16 f (dist i ) is an unknown smooth function
Old i is a binary variable that is one if the distance is greater than or equal to zero, i. e. if individual i is born between September 1 and February 28, and zero otherwise.
By imposing a linear trend that is allowed to have different slopes before and after the cutoff date, the regression discontinuity model can be written as
where dist i ranges between -6 and 5 and dist i ×Old i ranges between 0 and 5.
Both models are parametric models that are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. 17
However, the interpretation of the coefficients differs between the two models: While in the first model, α 1 measures the effect of an age difference of 11 months, the estimated coefficient of interest in the RD model (β 1 ) corresponds to the age difference exactly at the cutoff (i. e. 12 months).
The standard errors are clustered at the birth month level. As emphasized by Lee and Card [2008] , the discreteness of the assignment variable leads to random specification errors with a group structure. Conventional standard errors ignore this group structure and may therefore overstate the precision of the estimated effect.
16 This normalization is necessary in order to ensure that the treatment effect at the cutoff date is measured by β1 in a model with interaction terms [Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ]. The definition of disti for January and February differs from the definition for March to December in order to center the discontinuity. This is equal to redefining the year of birth to run from March to February rather than from January to December, so that the discontinuity is at the middle of the re-defined year [c. f. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2011] . 17 As noted by Lee and Card [2008] , non-parametric models cannot be estimated when the assignment variable is discrete.
The main outcomes in this analysis are the starting wage and the wage in each of the five years after the labor market entry. The model estimates the reduced-form effect of assigned age/old according to the school entry law on the (starting) wage of an individual without specifying any channel through which the (starting) wage could be affected. Since the school entry rule states that August-born kids have to enroll one year earlier than September-born kids, they are less mature at school entry and less mature when they have to decide which track to attend at age 10 (first tracking) and at age 14 (second tracking).
As discussed in section II, this difference in maturity potentially entails differences in school quality in grades 5-8 (direct effect) and differences in educational attainment (indirect effect). I assess the importance of the indirect effect by analyzing different measures of educational attainment.
The administrative data does not contain information on the actual age at school entry or track choice. Hence, there is no possibility to estimate a two-stage least squares regression with assigned age/old as an instrument for the actual age at school entry (or track choice). 18 Fortunately, the reduced-form effect is also informative and policy-relevant as it shows whether the combination of early tracking and the school entry rule leads to inferior outcomes for relatively younger students. Since the mapping from assigned age/old to the actual age (the first stage) is not one (due to late enrollment, early enrollment and grade retention), the estimated effect is the intention-to-treat effect and may encompass compensating effects. For instance, the age effect may be partly offset for students who repeat a grade or who do not comply with the school entry law and enroll one year later or earlier than they should according to the law. 19 Whether grade retention has positive or negative effects on student performance is still under debate. 20 Most recently, Manacorda [2012] shows that grade retention in junior high school increases school dropout and Jacob and Lefgren [2009] find negative effects on high school completion only for students who were retained in higher grade levels.
18 Based on the estimates obtained in Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] I could estimate a twosample two-stage least squares regressions. However, if both effects-the direct and the indirect one-exist, two instrumental variables would be needed to separately identify both effects. 19 As expected, late enrollment and grade repetition is much more frequently observed among the youngest students and early enrollment is almost exclusively observed among students born between September and December. See Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] .
20 See the evidence summarized in Jacob and Lefgren [2009] and Manacorda [2012] .
Another channel through which the (starting) wage could be affected are non-cognitive skills. Dhuey and Lipscomb [2008] and Thompson, Barnsley, and Battle [2004] provide evidence that older students have more leadership experience and self-esteem, which could have a positive effect on labor market outcomes. In contrast, Pellizzari and Billari [2012] argue that these psychological effects could decrease the amount of time that relatively younger students devote to social activities because they have a lower return to these activities. Using Italian data, they find that relatively younger students have less active social lives, devote more time to studying and perform better at university.
The estimated effect does not reflect ability differences if the birth month of an individual is randomly assigned and therefore, not related to unobserved characteristics that are correlated with wages (e.g. ability, parental background). Buckles and Hungerman [2008] show that children born in spring outperform children born in winter and have a better family background, suggesting that quarter of birth is not a valid instrument. 
IV.2 Data
The empirical analysis is based on administrative employment records from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). The ASSD is a matched firm-worker database which combines detailed longitudinal information on employment (including basic employer in-21 In a related paper, Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] show that controlling for an index of parental socioeconomic status and parental education has no impact on the reduced form effect of assigned age on track choice in grades 8 and 9.
22 These results are available upon request. 
IV.2.1 Definition of job starters
The labor market entry spell is defined as the first regular employment spell of an individual that is not a marginal employment spell 26 and lasts either for at least 60 days in a row 27 or for 180 days with the same employer but periods of non-employment in between.
Apprenticeship spells are not considered as entry spells, but rather as part of the education of an individual. The entry spell of an apprentice is the first employment spell-according to the criteria above-that is not an apprenticeship spell. 28
The main focus of the analysis is on male labor market entrants because the analysis of females involves several problems. First, due to the lack of information on working hours, the labor supply is only observed at the extensive margin and not at the intensive margin. Therefore, I can not distinguish between full-time work and part-time work, which is particularly a problem when analyzing female wages because females have a high probability of working part-time due to family responsibilities. 29 This may even complicate the analysis of starting wages because females may have children before they first enter the labor market. Second, females are more likely to temporarily leave the labor market when they have children which complicates the analysis of their wage profiles. Neither of these factors would represent a serious threat to the identification strategy unless the probability to have a child in a given year is correlated with month of birth. Since September-born females are on average 6 months older than August-born females at the time of the labor market entry they might have a higher likelihood of already having children at that point in time. Using additional data on the incidence of child birth I do find evidence for a higher likelihood of giving birth to a child before first entering the labor market for September-26 Marginal employment is employment with a yearly gross income below the minimum level for social security contributions. In 2000, the minimum contribution basis amounted to e 4,046.
27 An employment spell during the summer (June-September) that lasts 60 days or longer is not considered as first regular employment spell if this is the only employment spell in that year because this spell is most likely only a summer job of an individual that is still in education. 28 The definition of the entry spell is somewhat arbitrary. I also use other thresholds to test the sensitivity of the results (30 days/150 days and 90 days/180 days). Results do not change and are available upon request. 29 In 2004 born females. If these women are more likely to work part-time, the wage estimates include the labor supply response at the intensive margin and underestimate the true effect. 30 I only consider individuals who are Austrian citizens because migrants may have already started or even finished their education in their home country and there is no information on the year of migration in the database. Moreover, the estimation sample is restricted to individuals entering the labor market before they turn 31. A labor market entry above the age of 30 may indicate that the individual has already worked abroad, is still in education or is unable to find stable employment. Since I cannot distinguish between those explanations I drop these individuals from the estimation sample. 31 Figure 2 shows the distribution of the entry age for male labor market entrants. More than two thirds of all individuals enter the labor market between the age of 18 to 21, i.e. when they have finished secondary education or an apprenticeship training (and the compulsory military service). Nevertheless, I have carried out the whole analysis for the female sample. Due to considerations of space, these are not presented in the paper but are available upon request. In section V, I briefly report on the results after presenting the results for the male sample.
31 About five percent of male labor market entrants is older than 30 years and one percent is older than 40 years. Results based on an extended sample including all workers up to age 40 are similar to those presented below. These results are available upon request.
IV.2.2 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics
The estimation sample consists of 169,987 male labor market entrants. Summary statistics are provided in Table I Table II shows the distribution of the type of the first job spell and the average starting wage for each type. The majority of male individuals starts in a blue-collar job (56.5 percent) or a white-collar job (38.5 percent). About 1.5 percent directly enter a public sector job and 2.4 percent and 1.1 percent start as self-employed or farmer, respectively.
Individuals in public sector, white-collar and blue-collar jobs earn higher starting wages than self-employed workers or farmers. 33 Results are qualitatively similar if only apprentices with at least 2 or 3 years of apprenticeship training are considered as medium-skilled. 34 Since workers have to register at the public employment office to be observed in the subsample, this sample may be negatively selected. However, selection may not be such a problem because all individuals who do not start working immediately after finishing education have to register at the public employment office in order to be covered by the health insurance of their parents. Otherwise they have to pay on their own for health insurance.
V Results
The first part of the analysis focuses on the reduced-form effect of the school entry law (assigned age/old) on starting wages (section V.1) and educational attainment (section V.2). In the second part, I show how the effect evolves as workers gain labor market experience and provide further results on the labor supply response, job mobility and the employment history (section V.3). Table III presents regression results for estimation models 1 and 2. The dependent variable is the real daily log wage in the first regular employment spell as defined in section IV.2.1.
V.1 Starting wages
The base specification in the first column suggests that being born in August instead of September results in a wage penalty of 1.6 percent (model 1). Controlling for season of birth effects (column 2) does not significantly change the estimated coefficient and the estimates from the regression discontinuity model are also very similar. significantly less likely than August-born males to work in a blue-collar job and significantly more likely to work in a white collar-job. This difference in the type of entry job may be responsible for the observed wage penalty for August-born males. Blue-collar workers typically perform manual labor and are directly involved in the production process. In contrast, white-collar workers are non-manual workers in supervising, administrative, sales or service jobs. On average, white-collar jobs require more qualifications and pay higher wages.
Column 3 in Table III shows the estimated effect of the school entry rule conditional on the type of entry job. Since the conditional effect is very similar to the unconditional effect, the difference in the type of entry job does not seem to be responsible for the observed wage difference between August-born and September-born workers. 36
35 These results are available upon request. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting these robustness checks. 36 However, this coefficient should be interpreted with caution because the type of entry job can be considered as a "bad" control [Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ]. 
V.2 Educational attainment
Are these age-related differences in starting wages accompanied by differences in the quantity or quality of education? The remainder of i.e. apprenticeship that lasted at least 2.5 years are considered. Moreover, September-born individuals are more likely to be skilled workers (4.9-6.6 percentage points) and less likely to be unskilled workers (1.8-2.4 percentage points), and-in three out of four specifications-are significantly more likely to hold a degree (0.6-0.8 percentage points).
Results from a multinomial logit model (presented in Table A .II in the appendix) confirm the monotonic relationship between assigned age and the worker's skill level.
The analysis of the subsample for which a more detailed measure of educational attainment is available complements the results described above. September-born individuals are 2.3-3.6 percentage points more likely than August-born individuals to have completed at least a higher general or a higher vocational school. The estimated effects on educational attainment are in line with Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] , who show that August-born individuals are considerably more likely to attend a pre-vocational or an intermediate vocational school than September-born individuals.
The last row of Table V shows that the probability that detailed information on educational attainment is missing is related to an individual's month of birth. Detailed information on educational attainment is only available for individuals who have registered at the public employment office after finishing education. September-born workers are about 1 percentage point less likely to register than August-born workers (given a mean of 65 percent), indicating that the selection into the sub-sample is not completely random. Table A .III in the appendix shows that the effect on the starting wage in the subsample is comparable to the estimated effect for the total sample presented in Table III .
Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with some caution.
V.3 Short-run wage profiles
How does the effect of the school entry law evolve as workers gain labor market experience? Table VI presents results for up to five years after labor market entry. Again, both models described in section IV.1 are estimated. After the first year of labor market experience the wage penalty for August-born male workers has decreased to 1.0-1.5 percent, after the second year to 0.7-1.6 percent. In the third and the fifth year, wages for August-born are only significantly lower in the RD specification (0.8-1.1 percent). Table A .IV in the appendix show that the effect is not constant along the wage distribution: Again, estimates for the 10th, the 25th, the 50th, the 75th and the 90th percentiles of the conditional starting wage distribution are reported. Consistent with the results for starting wages (see Table A .I) the estimated effect is mostly not significant in the lowest decile. In the 25th percentile, the effect is steadily declining until-five years after job entry-August-born individuals face no significant wage penalty compared to September-born individuals. Similarly, in the highest decile, there is a tendency that the effect is declining and becoming less significant with increasing labor market experience. In contrast, in the 50th and the 75th percentile, the effect remains at 1.0-2.2 percent even after five years of experience. 1 for a definition of models 1 and 2. Each estimation includes only employed individuals. Therefore, the number of observations varies between the years. Wages are measured as average real daily wages over all employment spells in a given year conditional on being employed. Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clusters are birth months). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
Quantile regressions presented in
Since the analysis of wage effects is based on the subsample of employed individuals, Table A .V in the appendix shows whether individuals differ in their labor supply response at the extensive margin. The results suggest that the probability of having any employment spell in a given year is not significantly related to month of birth. However, Septemberborn males have about 6-8 more employment days than August-born males in the first and second year after labor market entry. This difference declines to 1-2 days after 3-5 years. These results suggest that September-born males are somewhat more attached to the labor force in the first years after labor market entry, which could imply that they had a better job match in the first place and therefore, are less likely to change their employer in the short run. Job mobility is considered as an important element of early career development and wage growth [Topel and Ward, 1992] . Table A .VI in the appendix shows that September-born workers are 1.7-1.8 percentage points more likely to change their employer in the first year after labor market entry. Therefore, a better job match in the first place may not explain why September-born workers earn higher wages in the beginning of their professional career. have spent more days in employment before their first regular employment spell. The analysis of (the duration) of apprenticeships shows that this effect is due to August-born individuals being more likely to have apprenticeship training. Excluding apprenticeships from past employment shows that the sign of the relationship reverses. Now, Septemberborn workers have more prior working experience than August-born workers; however, this comparison is somewhat unfair because August-born also gained working experience through apprenticeship training.
The analysis of unemployment experiences and employment in subsidized jobs is more conclusive. September-born individuals are less likely to be found in subsidized employment and are less likely to be registered as unemployed (or seeking employment) before their first regular employment spell. Moreover, they spend less days in unemployment and subsidized employment than August-born individuals. This evidence suggests that September-born workers earn higher wages and have fewer problems with finding employment because they have a higher education level. However, even if a lower education level is responsible for August-born workers' difficulties in finding employment, part of the wage effect may be due to a decrease in their reservation wage in response to these difficulties.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the school entry law entails differences in school quality and educational attainment between children born before the cutoff date and children born after the cutoff date and that these differences had a lasting impact on labor market outcomes.
Despite the concerns explained above, I have carried out the same analysis for the female sample. 38 These results suggest that the main conclusions, i. e. that the school entry rule has an effect on educational attainment and earnings in an early tracking system also hold for the female sample. Strikingly, the estimated effects on educational attainment are very similar to those estimated for the male sample. However, September-born females are more likely to have children before first entering the labor market, suggesting that they are also more likely to work part-time. The wage effect is not significant (or even negative)
for women with earnings in the 10th percentile of the wage distribution and increases along the wage distribution. This finding indicates that the child effect comes from women with low earnings potential. The quantile regressions for subsequent wages show a persistent earnings gap for women with earnings above the 50th percentile of the wage distribution.
VI Conclusions
Empirical studies have shown that the allocation of students to educational tracks is influenced by the position of a student in the age distribution within a cohort. The reason is that the track choice is based on a noisy signal of ability, the size of which is correlated with age. Therefore, early tracking is considered as particularly harmful and could have long-run effects on educational attainment and earnings. By international standards, first tracking occurs very early in Austria and Germany. Recent empirical studies for these countries show that the youngest students within a school cohort (grade) are significantly less likely to attend the academic track compared to their older peers [Jürges and Schneider, 2011; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010; Schneeweis and Zweimüller, forthcoming] .
In this paper, I estimate the reduced-form effect of the school entry rule, which assigns students to different school types based on their date of birth, on earnings and educational attainment for a sample of individuals entering the Austrian labor market between 1997 and 2000. The advantage of this strategy is that earnings differences between the youngest (i.e. August-born) and the oldest (i.e. September-born) individuals of a labor market entry cohort do not reflect differences in labor market experience but rather differences in the quantity and quality of education or skills acquired before entering the labor market.
The empirical analysis shows that September-born males earn 1.1-2.0 percent higher wages than August-born males in the year of labor market entry. The estimated effects differ along the conditional starting wage distribution with higher wage penalties in the middle and the higher end than in the lower end of the distribution. On average, the wage penalty amounts to 1.0-1.6 percent in the first and second year after entry and between 0.8 and 1.1 percent in the third and fifth year. Again, quantile regressions reveal heterogenous effects along the wage distribution.
The analysis of differences in the quantity and quality of education shows that Septemberborn males are less likely to have apprenticeship training, and consequently are less likely to work in a blue-collar job and more likely to work in a white-collar job. Furthermore, they are more likely to have at least higher general/vocational education and to hold a degree. Altogether, September-born individuals seem to have obtained a higher education level than August-born individuals.
Further analysis of the labor supply response and job mobility do not indicate that the wage penalty is explained by differences in the labor supply at the extensive or intensive margin or differences in match quality. There is some evidence that August-born workers had more difficulties in finding stable employment which is consistent with August-born workers having lower qualifications.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the school entry law has persistent negative effects on educational attainment and earnings for children born before the cutoff date. These findings are in line with the results on track choice in grade 5-8 and 9 obtained by Schneeweis and Zweimüller [forthcoming] . Moreover, the analysis shows that the possibility to revise the track choice after some years does not necessarily remove the disadvantage of those children-as shown by Mühlenweg and Puhani [2010] for Germany. 4 th year after job entry Assigned age -0.018 0.008** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.010 (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) Old -0.029** 0.006 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.017** (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 5 th year after job entry Assigned age -0.003 0.006* 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.010* (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) Old -0.007 0.005 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.015* (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Notes: This table shows results from quantile regressions of the wage after x years of potential labor market experience (see first column) on Assigned age (model 1) or Old, dist and dist × old (model 2) and dummies that indicate the year of labor market entry. See section IV.1 for a definition of models 1 and 2. Each estimation includes only employed individuals. Therefore, the number of observations varies between the years. Wages are measured as average real daily wages over all employment spells in a given year conditional on being employed. Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clusters are birth months). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clusters are birth months). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. a The dependent variable measures the probability to have any (non-marginal) employment spell in a given year. b The dependent variable measures the days of employment for employed individuals in a given year. c The number of observations depends on the number of (employed) individuals with non-missing wages. Therefore, the number of observations varies between the years. Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clusters are birth months). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level. a The number of observations depends on the number of (employed) individuals with non-missing wages. Any registered unemployment -0.004 -0.006* -0.008** -0.012** 0.34 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) Dur. of registered unemp. (days) -3.005** -4.397*** -5.269*** -6.440*** 66 (170) 1 for a definition of models 1 and 2. Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clusters are birth months). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
